Agency Access to Credit Bureau Files: Federal Invasion of Privacy? by Marotta, John J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 5 Special Issue The Revenue Act of 1971 Article 4
11-1-1970
Agency Access to Credit Bureau Files: Federal
Invasion of Privacy?
John J. Marotta
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John J. Marotta, Agency Access to Credit Bureau Files: Federal Invasion of Privacy?, 14 B.C.L. Rev. 110
(1973), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol14/iss5/4
4STUDENT COMMENT
AGENCY ACCESS TO CREDIT BUREAU FILES:
FEDERAL INVASION OF PRIVACY?
The complexities and demands of modern government have re-
quired the collection of enormous amounts of specific and statistical
data by government agencies.' To facilitate the use of such data, the
federal agencies have increased their use of electronic computers. 2
However, the rapid growth of computer use by federal agencies has
concomitantly increased the possibility that almost every aspect of an
individual's life will soon be within easy reach of whomever operates
the computer console! The belief that increased data gathering would
lead to widespread government surveillance' was one of the fears
underlying the storm of protest that persuaded Congress in 1967 to
set aside proposals for a National Data Center to collect and con-
solidate into one central computerized system all information collected
by federal, state and local government.5 Opposition centered on the
fear that such a center would destroy individual privacy, so that by be-
coming data rich we would become privacy poor! Improvements in
computer storage? heightened the likelihood that without adequate
safeguards, the prospects of government surveillance would be awe-
some! Now, with the advent and growth of the commercial credit
bureau,a the possibility that a national data center may be developing
in private hands has attracted congressional interest.°
1 The files of the federal government alone contain over 2.8 billion names, 264.5
billion police records, 342 million medical records, and 79 million psychiatric files. Hear-
ings on Computer Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Computer Priiacy Hearings]. .
2 See Hearings on Data Processing and Management in the Federal Government
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Data Processing Hearings].
a See A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 163 (1967).
4 Id. at 158.
5 See generally, Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a
New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1129-40
(1968) ; Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center,
82 Harv. L. Rev. 400 (1968).
6 See Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1968) (Remarks of Con-
gressman Gallagher) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Credit Bureau Hearings].
7 New laser techniques would permit storage of 645 million bits of digital data on
one square inch of magnetic tape. Westin, supra note 3, at 167:
8 ' Id. at 167-68.
9 See generally, Commercial Credit Bureau Hearings, supra note 6; Comment, Credit
Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 Geo. L. J. 509 (1969) ;
Miller, supra note 5, at 1140-54. '
10 Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Sen.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
S. 823 Hearings].
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The primary function of the commercial credit bureau , is Ahe col-
lection of credit information about individuals, in order to -assist ,credit
grantors, such - as commercial banks, in deciding whether or not to ex-
tend credit to a given individual." The credit grantors pay a fee to the
credit bureau in return for the information in the credit bureau's files. 1 1
This information provides "a concise and accurate report on a man's
past activities in the credit field, his general character, and his ability
to undertake a contract.”" Special credit reports can be obtained
regarding a. man's habits, reputation and neighborhood opinions 14
With this information, the credit grantor has a complete economic pros
file of an individual.1 5
The potential utility of such a broad range of information has
been recognized by the,agencies ,of the federal government, and recent
years have seen_ increased use by federal agencies of credit bureau ser-
vices." These agencies have included the Internal Revenue Service,"
the FBI" and other agencies." The use of private credit, bureaus by
federal agencies has given rise to the objection that information col-
lected for one purpose is being used for another without the consent
of the individuals invcilved. 20 Moreover, such information is acquired
by the federal agencies without any pledge of secrecy or any require-
ment that such information be kept confidential 2 1
Testimony has revealed that federal: agencies may acquire credit
information from credit bureau files both through voluntary compli-
ance on the part of the credit bureau 22 or through service of a sub-
poena by the federal agency upon the credit pureat.23 An example of
the latter form of acquisition is afforded in the recent decision of United
States v. Davey,", which marked the culmination of efforts by one
11 Commercial Credit Bureau Hearings, supra note 6, at 16.
12 The fees charged by one company ranged from 4-0 to 63 cents per report, de-
pending upon whether the request for information was handled by telephone or by
letter. Commercial Credit Bureau Hearings, supra note 6, at 157.
la Td.'at 2.
14
 Id. at 17.,
15 Id, at 49.
18 Computer Privacy Hearings, supra note 1, at 2; Commercial Credit Bureau Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 136.
17 Commercial Credit Bureau Hearings, supra note 6, at 136.
18 The FBI is one of the largest users of credit bureaus. S. 823 Hearings, supra note
10, at 92. .
15 These include government credit grantors, such as the Federal Housing Admin-
istration and the Veterans Administration. Commercial Credit Bureau Hearings, supra
note 6, at 90-91.
20 Symposium, iThe Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the
Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1371, 1428 (1968) ; See Pipe, Privacy: Establishing
Restrictions on Governmental Inquiry, 18 Am. U. L. Rev. 516, 540-41 (1969) ; Corn-
mercial Credit Bureau Hearings, supra note 6, at 135.
21 Computer Privacy Hearings, supra note 1, at 2.
22 Commercial Credit Bureau Hearings, supra note 6, at 136; S. 823 Hearings,
supra note 10, at 149.
25 S. 823 Hearings, supra note 10, at 231.
24 426 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
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credit bureau to 'challenge the right of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to gain access to its files.
In Davey, Gerald Davey, the President of Credit Data Corpora-
tion of New York, resisted a summons issued by the IRS pursuant
to Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.25 The sum-
mons demanded that Credit Data release to IRS all credit information
contained in its files concerning credit extended to certain taxpayers
by commercial banking institutions or any other credit grantors."
After Davey refused to grant the IRS request, the IRS sought en-
forcement of the subpoena in federal district court under Section
7402(b) of the Code.27 The district court granted the enforcement
order, but required the government to pay Credit Data 75 cents for
each credit report's Davey and Credit Data appealed the order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Davey and Credit Data raised several issues on appeal," includ-
ing the contention that the summons constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure." The court rejected all of the appellants' conten-
tions summarily," and concluded that there was ample evidence to
find that the IRS was acting in goOd faith, and that the summons was
proper, appropriate and necessary to the investigation by.the IRS into
the tax liability of the taxpayers." As such, the summons was neither
unreasonable nor out of proportion to the ends soughts''More impor-
tantly, the court added:
The government has the right to require the production
of relevant information wherever it may be lodged and re-
gardless of the form in which it is kept and the manner in
which it may be retrieved so long as it pays its reasonable
share of the costs of retrieval."
The Davey ,case graphically illustrates the competing interests
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,	 7602(2) authorizes the Secretary or his delegate to
summon "any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing
entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax . . . to produce such books,
papers, records or other data . . . as may be relevant or material to such inquiry. . ."
26 426 F.2d at 843 n.2.
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 	 7402(b) provides:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify
or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States
for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdic-
tion by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production
of books, papers or other data.
28 426 F.2d at 844.
29 Credit Data raised the following issues not here relevant: (1) whether the sum-
mons was burdensome; (2) whether compliance would injure its business; (3) whether
the work product of Credit Data should be protected; (4) whether or not Credit Data
possessed the information sought by the IRS. Id.
80 Id.
at Id.
32 Id.
88
 Id. at 845.
84 Id.
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often encountered in attempting to reconcile the legitimate fact-finding
function of government agencies with the concept of individual pri-
vacy. In apparent response to the Davey type situation, legislation
intended to bar access to credit bureau files by the IRS and other
non-credit granting government agencies is pending in Congress."
This comment will examine this pending legislation in light of the basis
and historical development of the administrative subpoena power, the
growing concept of a "right to privacy," and the legitimate investiga-
tive needs of government agencies in seeking to fulfill their legislative
mandates. The conclusion will suggest a possible means of balancing
the often conflicting interests of agency fact finding and individual
privacy.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA POWER
A. Early Restrictions on Government Access to Private Papers
The clash between government fact finders and the interests of
privacy is probably as old as organized government." Restrictions on
government access to private papers were imposed upon Congress in
the early case of Kilbourn v. Thompson," when the Supreme Court
barred Congress from imprisoning one Kilbourn for contempt when
he refused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a com-
mittee of the House of Representatives. In its opinion, the Court held
that the resolutions authorizing the investigation and the imprisonment
of Kilbourn were in excess of the power conferred upon the House by
the Constitution, and that the House had no authority to compel
testimony from a witness beyond what the witness chose to volunteer."
The Court made clear that neither the House nor the Senate "possesses
a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the
citizen."3°
Restriction on the government's access to private papers was made
more comprehensive by the later decision of Boyd v. United States,"
. where the Court struck down a statute compelling the production of
private papers for use in a criminal prosecution merely upon service
of a notice to produce whatever papers were sought. The Court de-
clared that the Fourth Amendment embodied principles applicable to
all invasions of individual privacy," and that:
[i] t is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the offense, . . . but any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
35
 S. 823, which is discussed infra, at 123. A companion bill, H.R. 10139, is presently
pending in the House Banking and Currency Committee.
83
 I K. Davis, Administrative Law § 3.01, at 160 (1958).
87
 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
88
 Id. at 196.
89 Id. at 190.
40
 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
41 Id. at 630.
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private papers , to convict of a crime or forfeit his goods, is
within the condemnation of that judgment.42
Therefore, the Court held that the statute constituted not .only a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment, but also an unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment." By implying that
forced prodUction of private papers could constitute an unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court cast into doubt both the ability of Con-
gress to issue subpoenas and its power to delegate such authority to
the agencies it created.
This doubt was compounded when, in Harriman v. /CC," the
Court barred the Interstate Commerce Commission on narrow statu-
tory grounds from conducting general investigations except in response
to a specific complaint's Agency use of subpoena power was further
limited in FTC v. American Tobacco Co.,4° where the Federal Trade
Commission was barred from issuing a subpoena without a showing
of probable cause. The Court declared that:
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the
Fourth Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress
"intended to authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep
all our traditions into the fire and to direct fishing expeditions
on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of. crime."
In a later case, the Court viewed agency use of the subpoena as
arbitrary, without safeguards, and equivalent to the practices of the
Star Chamber'" The Court would not adhere to " [t]he philosophy that
constitutional limitations and legal restraints upon official action may
be brushed aside upon the plea that good, perchance, may follovi...." °
Given the Court's fear of wholesale "fishing expeditions," it appeared
that the federal agencies would never be able to make broad use of
the subpoena power in fulfilling their statutory responsibilities.
B. Development of the Modern Principles
Governing Administrative Subpoena Power
_	 Notwithstanding the Court's apparent opposition to upholding
broad subpoena powers for federal agencies, the proponents of ad-
ministrative subpoena power continued to challenge this policy. The
crucial issue was the ability of government regulatory agencies to con-
42 Id .
48 Id. at 634-35. Although concurring in the result, a contrary view was expressed
by one member of the. Court who could not agree that a statute authorizing production
of evidence in a pending suit could be seen as authorizing an unreasonable search and
seizure. Id. at 641.
44 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
48 Id. at 419.
" 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
47 Id. at 305-06.
48 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 28 (1936).
4° Id. at 27.
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duct investigations which were essential to the proper -fulfillment of
their congressional mandates. In many instances, the conduct of in-
vestigations is an agency's most important function. Such investiga-
tions often explore broad, basic, policy problems affecting all of the
agency's work, including both adjudication and rule-making." Agency
investigations not only aid in adjudication and lead to the develop-
ment of new rules,m but may also provide the basis for recommenda-
tions to Congress for additional legislation." Consequently, the pro-
ponents of administrative subpoena power would not acquiesce in the
Court's attitude.
As the needs of modern government increased, additional regula-
tory agencies were created. Correspondingly, the need for more factual
data increased," and Congress responded with both increased use of
the subpoena power itself, and increased grants of such power to fed-
eral agencies. Thus, in McGrain v. Daugherty," the Court was again
faced with an attempt by Congress to subpoena information and wit-
nesses needed to enable it to exercise efficiently a legislative function
under the Constitution!' The Court in McGrain concluded that the
history of legislative power supported the principle that Congress,
through its own process, has the "power of inquiry—with process
to enforce it—[as] an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legis-
lative function."80
 Although not explicitly overruling Kilbourn v.
Thompson," the Court so distinguished that case as to leave little
doubt that Congress possessed' broad investigatory power in aid of
proposed legislation or in aid of general fact finding." Similarly in
Smith v. ICC," the Court upheld legislation expanding the right of
the ICC to conduct investigations as an aid to recommending new
legislation. In Smith, the Court observed:
The Interstate Commerce Act confers upon the Commission
powers of investigation in very broad language and this Court
has refused by construction to limit it so far as the business
of the carriers is concerned and their relation to the public.'
These cases foreshadowed a progressive diminution of the Court's
opposition to agency subpoena power. By 1940, this opposition had all
but ceased. In that year, a court of appeals upheld the right of an
administrative agency to require the disclosure of information "re-
gardless of whether there is any pre-existing probable cause for believe
58 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law
51 Id, at 165.
52 Id.
58 Id. § 3.04 at 174.
64 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
55 Id. at 160.
5 Id. at 174.
57 Discussed supra, at p. 113.
58 273 U.S. at 171 .
58 245 U.S. 33 (1917).
co Id. at 42.
3.02, at 164 (1958).
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ing that there has been a violation of the law."" The Supreme Court
denied certiorari," thereby further indicating its more liberal attitude
toward the use of administrative subpoenas.
Whatever doubts may have remained were put to rest by the
Court in subsequent decisions. In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,"
the Court made clear that a district court's duty was to enforce an
administrative subpoena when requested to do so." Subsequently, in
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling," the Court directed its
attention to the question of the necessity of showing probable cause to
justify the use of a subpoena in administrative investigations. Noting
first the confusion that had existed with respect to the Fourth Amend-
ment's role in administrative investigations, the Court observed that,
in its opinion, this confusion had developed because cases of actual
search and seizure were confused with cases involving constructive
searches and seizures.°° In reality, the Court concluded, these deci-
sions could be reconciled." Recognizing the problem of balancing the
public interest against individual privacy," the Court held that in
order to justify a subpoena it was not necessary for the agency to
affirm that a specific violation of the law existed as is the case in
obtaining search warrants." For an agency subpoena, the Court con-
tinued, probable cause is satisfied
by the court's determination that the investigation is author-
ized by Congress, and is for a purpose Congress can order,
and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry. Be-
yond this the requirement of reasonableness, including par-
ticularity in "describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized" . . . comes down to specifica-
tion of the documents to be produced be adequate, but not
excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry."
In the later case of United States v. Morton Salt Ca.," the Court's
opinion reflected its now more lenient attitude with respect to the
"fact-gathering" functions of administrative agencies in fulfilling their
statutory responsibilities. The Court emphasized that:
[The only power that is involved here is the power to
get information from those who best can give it and who are
most interested in not doing so. Because judicial power is re-
luctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to 
61 Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co, 114 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1940).
62 311 U.S. 690 (1941).
66 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
64
 Id. at 509.
65 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
66 Id. at 202.
67
 Id. at 202-09.
68 Id. at 203.
69 Id. at 208-09.
70 Id. at 209.
71 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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be relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow that an
administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are
enforced may not have and exercise powers of original in-
quiry. It has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it
that, which is not derived from the judicial function. It is
more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend
on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated
or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."
Thus, for an investigation to be valid, the Court concluded that it
is sufficient that (1) the inquiry is within the authority of the agency;
(2) the demand is not indefinite; and (3) the information sought is
reasonably relevant."
Although the administrative subpoena power is extensive, such
power is not without limits. As the opinion in Boyd indicated, a sub-
poena may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. This usually occurs if the subpoena is
unduly vague or overly broad.'" As such, the essence of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition is that the disclosure sought shall not be
unreasonable."
The Court's decision in CAB v. Hermann" adequately reflects
the Court's attitude toward the defense that a subpoena is unreason-
ably broad. In that case, the Court reversed a court of appeals de-
cision, and upheld a district court's enforcement of a subpoena served
upon the appellees in a proceeding before the CAB. The subpoena
called for practically all documents of the appellee accumulated dur-
ing a 38-month period.77
 The district court enforced the subpoena on
the basis that:
Wilk Court cannot say that any of the documents or things
called for in any of the subpoenas are immaterial or irrelevant
to the proceedings before the Board, without an examination
of all of the documents and things themselves which this
Court is not called upon to do at this stage of the proceed-
ings.78
In reversing, the court of appeals concluded that:
[I]n order to have the subpoena enforced, the issue as to
whether each of the documents subpoenaed is relevant and
material is a judicial question which must be passed upon
72 Id. at 642-43.
73 Id. at 652.
74 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
75 Id.
70 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
77 Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1956). The district court opinion
was not reported.
78 Id. at 362.
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by the court . . . . When the trial court said that, comparing
the allegations of the complaint with the demands of the sub-
poenas, he could not say that any of the documents were
irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings, he failed to pass
upon the judicial question presented to him in the case 79
In a per curiam reversal, the Supreme Court upheld the district
court's order finding that the court "duly enforced the Board's right
to call for documents relevant to the issues of the Board's complaint,
with appropriate provisions for assuring the minimum interference
with the conduct of the business of respondents.""
The preceding line of cases supports the conclusion that the de-
cision in United States v. Davey was correct. Unless the Court should
reverse the trend of cases upholding the broad investigative powers of
federal agencies, the right and the power of federal administrative
agencies to compel the production of documents which the agencies
consider relevant to their investigations seems settled in the agencies'
favor. However, in recent years the Supreme Court has manifested an
awareness of a comprehensive "right to privacy," protected by vari-
ous constitutional safeguards. The recognition of this "right to pri-
vacy" could provide a new basis for challenging administrative sub-
poenas.
II. PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Historical Development of the Concept of "Right to Privacy"
.	 The 'concept of a right to privacy has its origins in the Fourth
Amendment, which was the colonial response to the British practice
of issuing general warrants permitting wholesale searches and seizures
of personal property and effects.' So strong was the colonial opposi-
tion to this practice that James Otis resigned as Attorney General of
Massachusetts rather than bear the responsibility for issuing such
warrants." The primary intent of the Fourth Amendment, accord-
ingly, was preservation of the privacy and security of the people
against arbitrary invasions by government officials." The tort of in-
vasion of privacy committed by private individuals was first explicated
in the famous article by Warren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law
Review." The article argued that every individual possesses a funda-
78 Id. at 362-63.
80 353 U.S. at 323.
81
 See Comment, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 362-66
(1921). For a brief history of the Fourth Amendment, see Lassoni The History and De-
velopment of the Fourth Amendment (1937).
82
 34 Harv. L. Rev, 361, 364. John Adams believed that the Otis speech
in opposition to general warrants was an important step toward the Revolutionary War,
and that, "Then and there the Child Independence was born." Id. at 365.
88
 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ; Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 .(1967) ; McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1949).
-84 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). The
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mental right to privacy which consists of the right to control publicity
given to certain aspects of his life." Despite many decisions based
upon this concept, the precise scope of this right to privacy has been
difficult to define and its exact meaning is unclear."
Although the right to protection from private invasions of pri-
vacy has been recognized," no comparable protection, other than the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, exists with respect to the governments° With the increased
use of government questionnaires, the individual's option to withhold
certain aspects of his life has all but disappeared. Refusal to give
information might mean the loss of a jobs° or the denial of welfare
benefits" or the inability to procure a driver's license." Since the
government acquires most of its information as a precondition to
receiving government assistance," it is very difficult for the citizen
applicant to deny the government the information it desires.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut" has raised the possibility that the right to freedom from govern-
ment intrusion extends beyond the limits of ordinary search and
seizure.. In striking down a Connecticut statute which barred dis-
semination of contraceptive devices, the Court concluded that various
constitutional guarantees created zones of privacy," and that various
cases support the legitimacy of the concept of "right to privacy.""
Although the exact implications of Griswold are still unclear, the dis-
senters believed that its potential implications are quite broad. Com-
menting upon the amorphous nature of the concept of "privacy," Mr.
Justice Black declared that:
"[P]rivacy" is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept
which can easily be shrunken in meaning, but which can also,
on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional
ban against many things other than searches and seizures."
article traced various developments in the law of libel, slander and defamation, and con-
chided that in reality the courts were striving to protect a different right, the right of
privacy, and that such a right should be declared by the courts.
85 Id. at 198; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449-50 (1963).
86 See Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. Rev. I (1959) ;
Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).
87 See generally, W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 635-44 (2d ed. 1955).
88 No tort for invasion of privacy exists under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and,
in fact, the torts of defamation and slander are specifically barred. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80
(1964).
89 Symposium, The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the
Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1371, 1427 (1968).
90 Id, at 1426.
01 Id. at 1427.
02 Id. at 1426.
Oa 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
04 Id. at 484.
95 Id. at 485.
06 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
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Later cases have further illustrated the Court's increasing recog-
nition of the comprehensive right to privacy which was first recognized
in Boyd v. United States." ' Privacy has been held to include both
a right to anonymity," and a right to be free from arbitrary and ex-
cessive intrusions by government officials. 99 Furthermore, the Fourth
Amendment has been interpreted to protect people, not places,'" and
its protection has been viewed as embodying more than a mere
general right of privacy."' Although the law concerning the consti-
tutional ramifications of the right to privacy is still in a state of
flux, this uncertainty, when viewed in light of the preceding cases,
suggests that the right to privacy will be the subject of considerable
future litigation.
B. Balancing Government vs. Private Interest
The protection of the Fourth Amendment is not without limits.
Since it proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth
Amendment does not shield one from a valid investigation concerning
a legitimate government interest. A leading case dealing with the prob-
lem of balancing private and government interest is Camara v. Munici-
pal Court,'" where the Supreme Court held that municipal health in-
speCtors must obtain a search warrant before searching a private
dwelling for violations of the municipal health code. Further, the
Court reaffirmed the rule that probable cause is the standard by which
the constitutional requirement of reasonableness is fulfilled.'" As
such, the need for inspection must be weighed in terms of the reason-
able goals of code enforcement.'" Citing Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling,'" the Court reiterated the principle that "if a valid
public interest justifies the intrusions contemplated, then there is
probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant."'" More
importantly, the Court added that
[s] uch an approach . . . gives full recognition to the compet-
ing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing,
best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of
privacy."'
However, it is a judicial officer—a magistrate—not a policeman or
97 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; See text at notes 40-43 supra.
09 See cases cited in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennen
dissenting opinion).
90 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
100 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
101 Id. at 350.
1°2 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
103 Id. at 534.
104 Id. at 535.
10° 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
1°6 387 U.S. at 539.
107 Id.
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administrator who determines when the public interest is sufficiently
strong as to require private interest to yield."' In a housing inspection
case, for example, the magistrate can consider the needs of reasonable
code enforcement, the passage of time and the condition of the entire
area in determining whether the issuance of the warrant is reason-
able.'" In essence, with respect to the balancing of interests in Fourth
Amendment cases, the nature of the government interest involved
must be weighed against the nature of the intrusion contemplated. 11°
C. Application to Subpoenas
The recent broadening of the concept of privacy casts doubt upon
the continuing validity of the decisions upholding broad administrative
subpoena power. Arguably, if privacy has the broad limits envisioned
by the Griswold dissent, then administrative agencies should also be
required to observe the same standards of probable cause that were
required in Camara.'" It is submitted, however, that imposition of the
requirement that an administrative agency appear before a magistrate
and meet the standards of probable cause is not required by the Con-
stitution, and should not be required by the Congress. Such a require-
ment would serve neither the interests of government nor of the private
citizen.
First, as the history of the administrative subpoena power demon-
strates, the right of the agencies to issue subpoenas was established
only after a long struggle between those who wished to see government
unfettered in its quest for information, and those who were willing to
surrender their privacy only in the face of a paramount government
need. The law governing agency subpoena power, which was finally
clarified by the Supreme Court during the 1940's has remained con-
stant to the present. 112 The only constitutional issues in determining
the propriety of an administrative subpoena are (1) whether the sub-
poena is authorized by law, and (2) whether the scope of the subpoena
is so unlimited as to constitute the equivalent of a search. This view
is consistent with both the wording of the Fourth Amendment and its
historical origins, since although the Fourth Amendment was designed
108 Id. at 532-33; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ; Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
100 387 U.S at 538.
110
 Id. at 536-37.
111 The Camara standard and the standard of Probable cause for a criminal search
warrant are different with respect to what factors the magistrate must consider. Probable
cause for issuing a search warrant requires that reasonable grounds exist for the belief
that a crime has been committed. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
If an informer is involved, probable cause requires both a statement of the underlying
circumstances demonstrating why the informer believes a crime is being committed, and a
statement demonstrating the credibility of the informer. See Aguilar v, Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 114 (1964).
112 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964), is a most emphatic reiteration
of the standards set down in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946).
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to prevent untrammeled access by government officials to private ef-
fects, the reasonable needs of kovernment , were not to be denied. Thus,
as the Court in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling asserted,
administrative subpoenas involve "no question of actual search and
seizure."115
 Under this view, the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment is properly limited to government actions which constitute either
an actual search or its qualitative equivalent.
Secondly; the'view that administrative subpoenas are subject to
question only on the grounds of lack of authority or overbreadth, quite
adequately meets the needs of modern government. As indicated ear-
lier, .agency needs for factual data have increased enormously since
the 1940's, and the imposition of more stringent subpoena standards
upon the agencies would seriously Curtail investigations essential to
the process of recommending additional legislation and new rules.
Finally, more rigid subpciena requirements would 'also serve to
overburden the Magistrates and the cobrts. Many magistrates, espe-
cially in large cities, have such congested• calendars that it is almost
impossible for them to subject any "but the most extraordinary cases
to careful scrutiny.114
 The adverse effects - of 'increasing the superVisory
responsibility of the district courts for enforcing agency subpoenas or
of encouraging increased legal resistance to administrative subpoenas
would'only serve to aggravate court congestion, whiCh is already reach-
ing crisis proportions. 115 Federal investigators alone demanded' ap-
proximately 20,000 reports from a greater New York credit bureau
in one' year."e The repercussions which would have resulted hadtthese
investigators been required. to approach the magistrates or the courts
on each of these requests are evident. Either the federal investigators
would ha've abandoned their attempt to secure information which they
considered sufficiently important to be willing to pay to receive, or
they would have approached the magistrates or the courts with every
request, thus placing a 'severe strain upon the already overburdened
federal judiCial machinery: Moreover, since the magistrates' and the
courts could 'not begin to cope with so great a volume of subpoena
requests, subpoenas would probably be issued as a matter of course,
with no meaningful evaluation of the requests.• Consequently, the mag-
istrates and the courts would become mere "rubber stamps" for the
agencies with nothing more gained than the filing of vast amounts of
paper in the court records. For these reasons, as Justice Brennan has
115 327 U.S. at 195.
' • 114 .Report 'of the President's Commission on Law' Enforcement and the Admin
..
tstraticin of Justice: The Challenge of Criine . in a Free Society 10 (1967) [hereinafter
cited is President's CriMiCorisraission Report].
115 The interval between filling a civil complaint and commencement of trial in . the
Federal ,District Court for the . Sotitherri District of New York is now approximately 39
months, as compared with an average of 13 monthi in the rest of the country. New
York Times, June 5, 1970, at 39, col. 4.
118- Hearinga ,On' S. 823 'Before the SUbComm. on Financial Institutions of the Sen.
Comm. on Banking and Currency,' 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
S. 823 Hearings].
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cautioned, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment should not be
reduced to a procedural nicety. 117 What is needed instead is legislation
which will operate to protect individual privacy, while at the same time
permit the agencies to obtain information necessary to the fulfillment
of their proper and legitimate functions.
III. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The first legislative attempt to limit the access of the government
agencies to commercial credit bureaus is S. 823 118 which was intro-
duced by Senator Proxmire and has already passed the Senate. 119 The
bill is not a direct attack upon the ability of federal agencies to obtain
information from the credit bureaus, but seeks to accomplish this
purpose indirectly by limiting the persons to whom credit bureaus
may lawfully give information.
Under the Senate bill, employers, bona fide credit grantors, insur-
ance companies, and licensing agencies would be permitted to receive
reports from credit bureaus."' ° Non-credit-granting agencies would be
limited to receiving identifying information limited to an individual's
name, address, former addresses, and present or former places of em-
ployment.'" guch agencies could receive a full report only with the
consent of the individual,' 22 or in response to an application for em-
ployment.' 23 The bill would impose penalties on the credit bureau for
willful non-compliance" or for grossly negligent non-compliance" in
disclosing information to an unauthorized person. Administrative en-
forcement would be entrusted to the Federal Trade Commission.'"
Other provisions limit the type of information that may be kept in the
reports and require that certain information be removed from the
bureau's files when it becomes "obsolete."" 27
Although the proposed bill has merit in protecting the interests of
the individual from excessive private invasions of privacy, it does not
provide adequate safeguards against government invasions of privacy.
Concomitantly, the bill makes no attempt to balance effectively the
competing interests of individual privacy and government needs. First,
under the bill a credit bureau is required to disclose its information if
served with valid court process." 28 Although Senator Proxmire has
expressed the belief that the bill would bar the IRS and other non-
117 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963) (Opinion of Brennan, J.).
118 For the text of the bill, see 115 Cong. Rec. 513901 (daily ed. November 6, 1969).
All subsequent citations to S. 823 are to this source.
110 115 Cong. Rec. 5.13910 (daily ed.. November 6, 1969).
120 B. 823 § 604.
	
. .
121 Id. H 603 and 608.
122 Id. § 604(2).
125 Id. § 604(3) (b).
124 Id. § 616.
	 .
125 Id. § 617.
126 Id. § 620.
127 Id. § 605.
128 Id. § 604(1).
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credit-granting agencies, from obtaining credit bureau files,'" the bill
neither abrogates nor limits the statutory power of the IRS or other
federal agencies to subpoena desired information. Certainly enforce-
ment of a subpoena through the district courts would constitute valid
court process. Given the ease of enforcing subpoenas, the bill clearly
leaves this avenue of government access open. Secondly, the bill fails
to take into account the constant exchange of information which takes
place between the federal and state governments as well as among the
federal agencies themselves.'" The federal government exchanges in-
formation with 43 states and the District of Columbia."' The FBI, for
example, puts all of its information into its National Crime Center
for exchange with state and local police forces.'" Such exchanges will
in all likelihood increase as the recommendation of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement that all criminal information be
consolidated and made easily available to local police is imple-
mented.' 33
 If state tax or law enforcement agencies obtain informa-
tion from credit bureaus, the possibility exists that such information
may also become available to the federal government through ex-
change.
On the federal level, data exchanges have increased substantially
in recent years,'" with over 64 percent of all government information
being available for exchange among the agencies'" Furthermore, intra-
governmental exchange of information is encouraged under federal
law. Public Law 89-306'" specifically permits the General Services
Administration to establish a system for the exchange and pooling of
government information,'" and the GSA has expressed the desire to
do so.133 Under the Budget and Accounting Act,'" authority also exists
for developing standard computer codes to be used by all federal agen-
cies in order to facilitate the sharing of information." 0 With the recog-
nition of the desirability of a large common data base,"' the need for
a common coding system for all the agencies has also been recognized
129 S. 823 Hearings, supra note 116, at 161, 432-33 (Remarks of Senator Proxmire).
139 Hearings on Data Processing and Management in the Federal Government Be-
fore a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Data Processing Hearings] ; A. Westin, Privacy and
Freedom 160 (1967) ; Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a
New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1190
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
131 S. 823 Hearings, supra note 116, at 547.
132 Miller, supra note 130, at 1191.
133 President's Crime Commission Report, supra note 114, at 205-06.
134 Data Processing Hearings, supra note 130, at 2-3.
133
 Symposium, The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the
Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1371, 1387-88 (1968).
139 40 U.S.C. 759 (1964).
187 Pub. L. 89-306 11 111(b) (1), 79 Stat. 1127, 40 U.S.C. { 759 (1964).
138 Miller, supra note 130, at 1134.
139
 31 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1964).
140 Id. 21.
141 Data Processing Hearings, supra note 130, at 5.
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as a prerequisite for the most efficient utilization of the government's
information.142 Moreover, since modern computers are able to ex-
change information automatically with other computer systems, unless
some control is imposed, the possibility exists that information in one
agency will flow automatically to another. Thus, information lawfully
obtained by the Veterans Administration may possibly be acquired by
the IRS. Any protection provided by 5.823 would be effectively cir-
cumvented by any one of these occurrences.
Therefore, although the bill provides some measure of protection
against private unauthorized disclosure of information in credit bureau
files, 5.823 would still permit the IRS and other government agencies
to obtain credit bureau information either through administrative sub-
poena or through the normal course, of governmental exchange of in-
formation. Future legislation, therefore, should be directed toward the
difficult problem of determining just what information the government
legitimately needs, and should seek to establish some supervisory con-
trol over both the acquisition of that information and its disposition
once it is acquired.
.	 IV. SUGGESTED LEGISLATION
A. The Need for a,Computer Agency
Future legislation should have, two objectives: first, recognition
of the legitimate needs of government for certain kinds of information,
and second, recognition of the principle that government has only a
limited privilege to inquire into the lives of its citizens. It is submitted
that the most feasible method of achieving these objectives is through
the creation of an independent federal agency, the Data Processing
and Management Office (DPMO), which would supervise and coordi-
nate the government's acquisition, storage and release of computerized
information.143 The different demands of the various federal agencies
render it unlikely that a single piece of legislation could encompass
the variety of problems each agency faces without becoming massive
and unwieldly. The information needs of the Internal Revenue Service
will differ greatly from those of the Social Security Administration,
and legislation that attempts to limit in one sweep the activities of
both could prove totally unworkable. On the other hand, a piecemeal
legislative approach will be confusing and, given the nature of the
legislative process, may be unable to keep pace with, the rapidly de-
veloping field of computer technology. •
The creation of a Data Processing and Management Office, how-
ever, would avoid these problems. The role of the DPMO would be
analogous to that of the General Accounting Office. However, instead
of being a watchdog over taxpayers' dollars, the DPMO would pro-
tect individual privacy against the proclivity of federal agencies for
142 Id. at 19.
148 See Miller, supra note 130, at 1238-39.
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information collection and exchange..By creating a separate agency,
the problem of the DPMO becoming too closely associated ',with one
agency will be avoided, ,thus insuring that the DPMO will function
effectively and impartially.'"
Since agencies view confidentiality * requirements as a hindrance
to, efficient acquisition and use of- information,1" the DPMO would
serve an important function by impartially supervising the overall
"flow" of information into and out of the federal .agencies.
B. Purpose and Function
In enacting the enabling legislation, Congress should declare that
the purpose Of the DPIVIO:will be to insure the protection of individual
privacy while recognizing the legitimate needs of governnient to ob-
tain required information: This legislation should establish 'broad
standards of confidentiality governing the disclosure and exchange of
acquired information, leaving to the DPMO the formulation of,precise
ruleS applicable to the respective federal agencies and-the multitude of
problems peculiar to each agency. Since the DPMO" will act• as a
watchdog on the other agencies, it must necessarily be given access
to the records of other government 'agencies.'" It will also need the
power to promulgate appropriate rules binding upon the other agen-
cies,147
 and adequate power to COnipel compliance with these rules.
COnsideration will have to 'be given to permitting the DPMO to limit
the exercise of the subpoena paver by other' agenCies by specifically
delineating the types of information which may be gathered by sub-
poena. Otherifise, any rules :promulgated by the DPMO could• be
circumvented by judicious use of the Subpoena pinver.' - •
The rules prothulgated by the agency must protect confidentiality
of appropriate information, while not impeding any agency in the
fulfillthent of its statutory duties. The procedures- for promulgating
rules shoilld be such as will insure that the DPMO may not act arbi-
trarily. 'There must also be' adequate , provisions for informing the
sister agencies and theft' depaftment heads' of the limits placed•UpOn
their information gathering and disseniination actiVities. The Dpmo,
however, need not'be bound by the rule-making procethires set forth
in the Administrative Procedure Act, 148 since the agency will be pri-
marily- concerned with intra-govehlinental control and organization,
144 Hearings' On S. 1195 Before the Subcomni'..On Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary; 89th' Cong., 2fid Sess. 1244 (1968).
- 145 Hearings on Computer . Privacy Before the Subcoliam. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Sen. Comm. on thejudiciary; 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Computer Privacy Hearings]. , ,.
146 The Buieau of 'the-Budget already, possesies such authority. See 31 U.S.C.-{ 21
(1 4264: "
147' By'A"ray 'of analogy, 31 U.S.C. #§ 18(a)(6) . grant to the Bureau' of the
Budget authority to determine whether information sought by an agency is really neces.
sary to the agency's purpose.
148 5 U.S.C. # 1001 et seq. (1964).
'426
AGENCY ACCESS TO 'CREDIT BUREAU FILES
and the APA was designed to 'guarantee due process in rule-making pro-
cedures affecting non-governmental activities.
The rules promulgated by the DPMO should cover at least four
principal areas: (1). information collection, (2) disclosure and ex-
change, (3) destruction of obsolete information, and (4) sanctions
for unlawful disclosure.
1. Collection of Information
At the present time, federal agencies request from individuals
whatever information . they desire, and until recently, practically no
one has questidned the validity of such requests. However, recent
House hearings on the 1970 Census have amply demonstrated that
Americans would no longer submit passively to even census ques-
tions."° The DPMO should independently determine the types of in-
formation legitimately required by each agency. Such an approach
would not be novel, since statutory authority presently exists for the
Bureau of the Budget to make a similar determination for budgetary
purposes.'"
In making that deternlination at, least three factors should be
considered: (1) necessity for the information, (2) the nature of the
information sought, and (3) the intended use of the information.
Necessity should be justified by the agency seeking the information
and not accepted as a matter of course. If the information is of the
opinion or hearsay type concerning a particular individual, such in-
formation should be eliminated unless it is absolutely required in
carefully defined cases, such as those involving national security. If
the information gathered or sought is in the nature of a public opinion
survey, or has been gathered for statistical purposes, such as the
census, then possibly a broader range of permissible questions may be
allowed. On the other hand, information obtained, for example, to
determine eligibility for public assistance, should be confined to those
questions specifically relevant to the question of eligibility as defined
in the pertinent statutes and regulations. The DPMO would possess
the expertise and flexibility to develop regulations conducive to these
ends, and if required, exceptions could be permitted in cases of ex-
ceptional need.
2. Disclosure and Exchange
In considering 'questions of disclosure. and exchange, the DPMO
should be guided by standards similar to those suggested in connec-
tion with deterinining the propriety of initial data collection. A realistic
appraisal of the types of information each agency actually needs in
order to fulfill its statutory duties should serve as the basic guideline
for determining whether one agency 'should have access to another
149 See generally, Hearings on the 1970 Census Questions Before the House Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
Ito 31 U.S.C. U 18(a)-(b) (1964).
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agency's information. Such an appraisal will also have to be made
with respect to the various state agencies which are able to utilize
information stored in the government's computer banks.
To achieve maximum efficiency of exchange, two multi-agency
computer systems have been suggested: the federated system, and the
cluster system."' In a federated system, each agency would have its
own computer, and would be free to exchange information with other
agencies as circumstances required."' In a cluster system, agencies
utilizing somewhat similar information, such as the FAA and the
CAB, would be grouped on the same central computer system, but
there would be no exchange among the various clusters.'" The DPMO
would have to decide which type of system to adopt after weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of each. Lastly, the DPMO will have
to regulate the programming of the computer systems in order to pre-
vent the automatic flow of information from one system to another
among the various, agencies. Although this is a difficult problem, with-
out such a safeguard many advantages inherent in a watchdog agency
such as DPMO would be lost.
3. Destruction of Obsolete Information '
Testimony has already indicated that information may remain in
government computer banks long after it has become obsolete. The
FHA, for example, has admitted that information may stay in its
system for six or seven years after it has become obsolete.' The
DPMO should prescribe rules designed to combat this problem as
effectively as possible. Senator Proxmire's bill makes some provision
for this by placing limits on the retention in credit bureau computer
banks of bankruptcies, judgments, pending or settled suits ; tax liens,
uncollectable accounts, and arrest records."' These provisions could
provide a useful starting point in formulating similar rules for imple-
mentation by the DPMO. In any event, some authority other than
the federal agencies must be charged with the responsibility of deter-
mining what information should be eliminated from agency computer
systems, and this authority must also have the power to enforce its
decisions.'"
4. Sanctions
Finally, provisions will have to be made to provide for sanctions
against government employees or anyone else who unlawfully discloses
161 Symposium, The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the
Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1371, 1450-51 (1968).
132 Id,
153 Id,
164 Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before a Suhcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1968).
155 S. 823 § 605.
no See 31 U.S.C. §§ 18(a)-(c), 21 (1964) which purport to give the Bureau of
the Budget some coordinating authority over information in agency files.
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information, whether such disclosure be made willfully or negligently.
Creation of a cause of action for unlawful disclosure of information
should be considered in order to compensate individuals damaged by
a breach of confidentiality. In the alternative, sanction enforcement
powers could be vested in the DPMO itself, with provisions for strict
liability and fixed fines, thereby relieving injured parties of the diffi-
cult problems often encountered in proving damages. Without some
sanctions, the temptation would doubtless arise to tap into the govern-
ment's computer system for private gain.'"
CONCLUSION
The problem of balancing individual privacy against government
needs in the area of information gathering is indeed a troublesome
one. The legitimate needs of government will not be met if federal
agencies are stripped of their subpoena power, and are compelled to
seek a court order each time they need information. As shown earlier,
the results of such a procedure would have a disastrous impact upon
both the private and the public sector.
It is suggested that the government voluntarily limit itself in the
area of information gathering and storage, in a manner that will insure
both privacy for the individual and flexibility for modern governmental
purposes. Vesting supervision and control of the government's com-
puterized information in one supervisory agency provides a means of
guaranteeing that the government's needs will be met, while individual
privacy is protected from unnecessary and repetitious governmental
probing.
JOHN J. MAROTTA
1 " Computer Privacy Hearings, supra note 145, at 5,
129
